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FRIENDS WITH BENEFITS:
ANALYZING THE IMPLICATIONS OF
UNITED STATES V NEWMAN FOR THE
FUTURE OF INSIDER TRADING
TEBSY PAUL*
In the 2014 case United States v. Newman, a federal appeals court
vacated convictions of insider trading and dismissed the indictments
against two former hedge fund traders, Todd Newman and Anthony
Chiasson. In overturning their convictions, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ("Court") held that the U.S. Attorney's
Office for the Southern District of New York ("Government')failed to
prove that the corporate insiders received a significant benefit for
tipping downstream tippees, who were several levels removed from the
corporate insiders. The Court also held that the Government failed to
show that the defendants had any knowledge of the alleged benefits that
the insiders supposedly received. The Court reasoned that the benefit
conferred to the tippees must be "of some consequence " so that it is no
longer sufficient to show just friendship as a form of benefit. After the
ruling, the Government sought a rehearing en banc and argued that the
ruling departs from United States Supreme Court and Second Circuit
precedent and that it threatens the effective enforcement of securities
law, specifically in cases involving remote tippees and tippers.
Following the denial for a rehearing by the Second Circuit, the
Government filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
which was also denied on October 5, 2015.
This Comment argues that the Court's decision in Newman, requiring a
tangible personal benefit, is proper because the decision clarified the
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requirements necessary to sustain a conviction for remote tippee
liability in insider trading cases. The Court's decision correctly curbed
the government's ability to bring insider trading cases by limiting the
Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") broad interpretation
of existing securities law. The SEC's broad interpretation has damaged
the overall efficiency of the market by limiting the incentives of market
participants to obtain information and make informed trading
decisions. Furthermore, this Comment will recommend the need for
Congress to enact create laws directly criminalizing insider trading
behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
In the recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit ("Second Circuit" or "Court"), United States. v. Newman,
1
the Court reviewed its standard for prosecuting "downstream" or "remote"
tippees under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Securities
and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") Rule lOb-5 . In Newman, the Court
3 4
vacated the conviction of two "remote tippee"3 hedge fund managers and
1. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
2. Andrew C. Whitman, The Supreme Court Should Overturn U.S. v. Newman
and Recognize a New Type of Insider Trading Liability, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (Jan. 20,
2015), http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/aclr-online/supreme-court-should-
overtum-us-v-newman-and-recognize-new-type-insider-trading-liability/.
3. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 446 ((explaining the relationship between a "tipper"
("the insider or misappropriator in possession of material nonpublic information") and
a "tippee" (the outsider to whom the tipper discloses such material information, "who
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concluded that "the government must show that someone who received
inside information and then traded on it ... knew that the source received a
benefit for providing the tip."' 5 This decision is particularly troublesome
for the Government because the Court redefined what constitutes a
personal benefit, holding that "the mere fact of a friendship" is not enough
to justify a charge of insider trading. 6 In Newman, the Court concluded that
the career advice and friendship the defendants received or maintained, and
thereafter traded on, did not amount to a "personal benefit" that represented
a potential gain of a "pecuniary or similarly valuable nature."7 This new
heightened standard of proof will make it harder for the Government to
successfully prosecute future insider trading cases involving remote tippers
and tippees.
On January 22, 2015, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara announced that he
would ask for an en banc hearing by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
to review the Court's landmark ruling in United States v. Newman,
8
then trades on the basis of the information before it is publicly disclosed")).
4. See id. at 455.
5. Peter J. Henning, Fallout Builds from Ruling on Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 20, 2015, 12:32 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/20/fallout-from-
insider-trading-ruling/?_r=0.
6. See Alison Frankel, In Insider Trading Appeal, Justice Department Makes Big
Concession, REUTERS (Jan. 26, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/
01/26/in-insider-trading-appeal-justice-department-makes-big-concession/ (explaining
that a tipster must have a meaningfully-close personal relationship with the initial
recipient of confidential information or else stand to receive a pecuniary benefit from
the disclosure).
7. See generally Daniel P. Chung & Avi Weitzman, United States v. Newman:
Second Circuit Ruling Portends Choppier Waters for Insider Trading Charges Against
Downstream Tippees, GIBSON DUNN: PUBLICATIONS (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.gib
sondunn.com/publications/pages/US-v-Newman-Second-Circuit-Ruling-Portends-
Choppier-Waters-nsider-Trading-Charges-Against-Downstream-Tippees.aspx
(suggesting that Newman would now "re-invigorate" the original meaning of the Dirks
benefit test, making it harder for the Justice Department and the SEC to prevail where
evidence of a pecuniary benefit to the tipper is not readily provable).
8. Newman, 773 F.3d at 438, reh'g en banc denied, United States v. Newman,
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5788 (2d Cir. Apr. 3, 2015); see also Roger Parloff, Top
Manhattan Prosecutor Will Challenge Landmark Insider Trading Case, FORTUNE (Jan.
23, 2015, 2:06 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/01/23/top-manhattan-prosecutor-will-
challenge-landmark-insider-trading-case/; Stephanie Russell-Kraft, SEC Backs Bharara
in 2nd Circ. Insider Trading Appeal, LAW360 (Jan. 26, 2015, 6:27 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/615237/sec-backs-bharara-in-2nd-circ-insider-trading-
appeal (noting the SEC's support of the government's motion for an en bane hearing.
Based on its belief that the Second Circuit's holding was incorrect, the SEC filed an
amicus brief explaining that "[t]he panel's narrowed definition of personal benefit and
lack of clarity about the evidence required for establishing such benefit could
negatively affect the SEC's ability to bring insider trading actions. Any such
weakening of the SEC's ability to effectively police and deter insider trading could
2015
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although the request was denied on April 3, 2015. While the Government
considers the Second Circuit's decision in Newman to be troublesome, 9 the
defense counsel promptly declared the decision a "resounding victory for
the rule of law."' 0 The Newman decision has already received considerable
commentary. Some have expressed full-fledged support, calling the
Second Circuit's decision a well-deserved lesson for the Government,
particularly after Bharara's weak crusades against insider trading." Others
have condemned the decision, believing that it "shield[s]from
accountability Wall Street's corrupt culture."'1
2
Prior to the SEC's creation in 1934, the public had little confidence in
the federal government's ability to regulate the securities market.'
3
Prompted by the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression, it
was first imperative to rebuild the public's faith in the capital markets in
order to restore the country's economy. 14 Insider trading regulation began
with the implementation of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"),
which mandated "full and fair disclosure." The enactment of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Securities Exchange Act") followed, and it
codified laws for the "disclosure and disgorgement of insider trading
profits."
undermine investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the securities markets.").
9. See Henning, supra note 5 (stating that prosecutors believe that the Newman
ruling will tie their hands in pursuing Wall Street crime).
10. See Ben Protess & Matthew Goldstein, Appeals Court Deals Setback to
Crackdown on Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2014, 10:19 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/appeals-court-overtums-2-insider-trading-con
victions/ (demonstrating defense counsel's relief of the Second Circuit's decision).
11. An Outside the Law Prosecutor, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2014, 8:18 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/an-outside-the-law-prosecutor- 1418260680 (noting
Bharara's attempt to "expand the definition of insider trading to whatever he could sell
to a jury" as well as exploiting both "public anger against the finance industry as well
as the ambiguity in the legal definition of insider trading" when prosecuting insider
trading cases).
12. See William K. Black, The Second Circuit Makes Sophisticated Insider
Trading the Perfect Crime, NEW ECON. PERSP. (Dec. 11, 2014),
http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2014/12/second-circuit-makes-sophisticated-inside
r-trading-perfect-crime.html (noting that the Second Circuit's decision leads to the
perfect crime because it is guaranteed to make elite traders who trade on inside
information wealthy and providing a roadmap allowing those elite traders to arrange
the scheme with total impunity from criminal laws).
13. The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwe
do.shtml#.VLIVOCvF-M (last updated June 10, 2013).
14. See also id. (suggesting that once Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, both federal and state prosecutors had "more
ammunition to convict inside traders by requiring mandatory disclosure and fair
treatment of investors").
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In the 1960s, under its authority granted by Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act ("Section 10(b)"), the SEC and federal courts
applied the antifraud principle of SEC Rule lob-5 to insider trading cases.
1 5
The application of Rule lOb-5 effectively allowed the SEC to prosecute
securities fraud through administrative actions and federal lawsuits.
1 6
Today, the profitable business of illegal insider trading has developed to
include cases that are in all types of sectors, like the banking, technology,
and pharmaceutical sectors. 17
Part I of this Comment provides background on insider trading law by
highlighting relevant statutory and case law that have shaped United States'
securities law. Part II addresses the potential fallout for the Government's
future insider trading cases based on the Second Circuit's decision in
Newman. Part III concludes by recommending that Congress draft and
implement laws that directly target the current insider trading legal regime
to mitigate the illegal profits reaped by insider traders.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF INSIDER TRADING
Throughout the years, the Government has applied various securities
laws in an effort to combat insider trading. The Securities Act was applied
to insider trading to provide investors with a "full and fair disclosure of
character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through
the mails, and to prevent frauds in sale thereof."' 8 The Securities Exchange
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012) (making it unlawful for any person through the means
of interstate commerce to scheme or defraud or make any untrue statement of. a
material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of any security); see 17 C.F.R.
240.1Ob-5 (2015); see also Nelson S. Ebaugh, Insider Trading Liability for Tippers and
Tippees: A Call for the Consistent Application of the Personal Benefit Test, 39 TEX. J.
Bus. L. 265, 269 (2003), http://www.ebaughlaw.com/uploads/1/1/9/4/11948411/tjbl_
article.pdf (stating that the principal tools used by the SEC and private plaintiffs to
prosecute insider trading are Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule
1 Ob-5).
16. See Ebaugh, supra note 15, at 269.
17. See Chris Matthews, How Profitable is Insider Trading, Anyway?, FORTUNE
(Oct. 20, 2014, 1:25 PM), http://fortune.com/2014 /l0/20/insider-trading-profits/
(suggesting insider trading is "insanely" profitable by demonstrating that the median
investor betting $200,000 on the basis of an illegal tip can reap $72,000 on that trade-
amounting to a thirty-five percent gain with a turnaround period of just twenty-one
days); see also Preet Bharara: Insider Trading Is "'Rampant" on Wall Street,
FRONTLINE (Jan. 7, 2014, 9:41 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontlinebus
iness-economy-financial-crisis/to-catch-a-trader/preet-bharara-insider-trading-is-rampa
nt-on-wall-street/ (explaining how Bharara suggests that the hedge fund business is not
the only business that insider trading is exploiting).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2013); see SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699,
701 (10th Cir. 1937) (reiterating that the purpose of the Securities Act is to provide full
and fair disclosure for investors).
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Act strengthened the Securities Act's prohibitions of fraud in the sale of
securities. 19 Other statutory provisions that govern insider trading include
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 198420 ("ITSA") and the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.
21
Under SEC Rule 10b5-1, an insider trading violation occurs when there
is a purchase or sale of a security on the basis of information that is
material, nonpublic, and traded in breach of fiduciary duty.22 SEC Rule
1 Ob-5 specifies that only untrue statements or omissions of material fact are
actionable. 23 "An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider [the information] important in
deciding how to vote.",24 The "disclose or abstain rule" is premised on case
law decided under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC
25Rule lOb-5's theory of equal access to information. The "disclose or
19. See Parloff supra note 8. See generally Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1989) (holding that both the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 should be construed
harmoniously because they "constitute interrelated components of federal regulatory
scheme governing transactions in securities").
20. See Thomas C. Newkirk, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Speech at Jesus
College 16th Int'l Symposium on Economic Crime: Insider Trading - A U.S.
Perspective (Sept. 19, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/
1998/spch221.htm (stating that ITSA served as a deterrent after the Commission
determined that injunctions and disgorgements were inadequate deterrents. "The Act
provides penalties up to three times the profit gained or the loss avoided by the insider
trading."); see also Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading: The Supreme
Court Misappropriates the Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157,
1166 (1997) (suggesting that "using ITSA as an effective weapon, the SEC became
increasingly vigorous in enforcing insider trading prohibitions" and the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act "bolstered the civil and criminal remedies
available for Rule lob-5 violations").
21. Newkirk, supra note 20 (stating that the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act expanded the Commission's ability to request testimony and
production of documents from foreign security authorities so the Commission could
obtain information to assist foreign regulators).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2015).
23. Id. § 240.10b-5(b) (2015); see also WILLIAM WANG & MARC STEINBERG,
INSIDER TRADING 109 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining that there are two kinds of material
information: (1) information about the issuer's internal affairs, such as its earnings and
profits, or (2) information such as knowledge about a forthcoming tender offer for the
stock). See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 34
(2d ed. 2007).
24. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (noting that this
standard does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted
fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote).
25. Compare Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961) (extending the "disclose or
abstain" rule beyond classical insiders and deciding that a "corporate insider" (anyone
that had access to nonpublic information) must abstain from trading in the shares of his
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abstain rule" states that "when a public issuer or one of its insiders is in
possession of undisclosed material information, the issuer or insider must
either disclose the material information before trading in the issuer's
securities or abstain from trading in the issuer's securities."
In insider trading cases, the government must establish that the person
traded with the requisite scienter 26 while in possession of "nonpublic"
information. The distinction between public and nonpublic material
operates along a spectrum. At one end is information disclosed by a
company through official channels of communication, such as those the
SEC mandates; 27 at the other end are cases involving information leaked to
the media, Internet, or individuals who have an interest in obtaining the
information.28 Courts have established two theories to determine whether
the information is considered public or not. Under the first theory, before
insiders can act upon material information, the information must be
disclosed by the original source in a manner sufficient to insure its
availability to the investing public. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the
SEC brought an action against the defendants alleging violations of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78, and Rule lOb-5.29
Texas Gulf Sulphur ("TGS") officials discovered evidence of a major ore
deposit,30 and shortly after, company officials planned to publicly announce
the findings in a major press conference. 31 In the days leading up to the
corporation unless he has first disclosed all material inside information known to him),
with United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 226-30 (1980) (shifting back to the
requirement that a relationship giving access to nonpublic information exist, when
determining who is an insider).
26. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 702 (1980) (defining "scienter" as the
defendant's mental state embracing an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud); see
also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that "a private
cause of action for damages will not lie under [Section] 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in the
absence of any allegation of 'scienter' - i.e. intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud").
27. See Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading: Legal
Theories, Common Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Compliance, 8
N.Y.U.J.L. & Bus. 151, 170-74 (2011) (discussing the different theories of insider
trading and the distinction between public and nonpublic information).
28. See id.
29. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding
that not only are directors or management officers of corporation "insiders" within
meaning of rule of SEC, so as to be precluded from dealing in stock of corporation, but
the rule is also applicable to one possessing information. Thus, anyone "in possession
of material inside information" is an "insider" and must "either disclose it to the
investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect corporate
confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending
securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.").
30. See id. at 843.
31. See id. at 844-46.
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formal statement announcing the discovery of ore deposits, TGS insiders
bought stock or stock options in the company.32 Others tipped off outsiders
who, in turn, also bought stock in the company.33 Upon discovering the
scheme, the SEC sued TGS and argued that the company's press release
about the discovery was "materially false and misleading" and that TGS
officers and employees knew this information was false.34 The Second
Circuit held that where a formal announcement to the media is revealed, all
insider activity must await dissemination of the promised official
announcement.3 5
Under the second theory, information is public when trading causes the
information to be integrated into the price of the particular stock. In United
States v. Libera, the Supreme Court found the defendants guilty of
conspiracy and securities fraud for insider trading.36 The Government
argued that the defendants executed trades in stock based on information in
advance copies of Business Week.37 The defendants' convictions were
based on the misappropriation theory, which stated that "one who
misappropriates nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty and
trades on that information to his own advantage violates Section 10(b) and
[SEC] Rule lOb-5.",38 Although the defendants argued that the advance
copies of Business Week-containing the information which they used to
execute their trades-was based on public information, the Second Circuit
disagreed. The Second Circuit held that information may be considered
public for Section 10(b) purposes-even though there had been no public
announcement and only a small number of people know of it-if trading
has caused the information to be fully impounded into the price of the
particular stock.39
To ensure a fair market, the "disclose or abstain" rule states that if
information is not public, one must either disclose the information before
trading on the information or abstain from trading if the information is not
released to the public. In accordance with application of the "disclose or
32. See id. at 842, 847.
33. See id. at 844.
34. See id at 858.
35. See id at 854 (holding that, at a minimum, the defendant should have waited
"until the news could reasonably have been expected to appear over the media of
widest circulation").
36. See United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 602 (2d Cir. 1993).
37. See id. at 598.
38. See id. at 599.
39. Id. at 601 (agreeing with appellants and stating that information may be
considered public for Section 10(b) purposes even though there has been no public
announcement and only a small number of people knew about it).
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abstain" rule, there must be a determination of whether a fiduciary
relationship exists between the inside trader and those with whom he or she
is about to trade.4a  Whether an individual has violated a fiduciary duty
depends on the nature of the fiduciary relationship that the government is
asserting. There are three traditional theories of insider trading liability
that this Comment will discuss: the "classical" theory, the "tipper-tippee"
theory, and the "misappropriation" theory. These theories all cover
different types of fiduciary duties, each with different types of relationships
and obligations. Accordingly, when applying these theories, the
government has the burden of proving that a person trading on a tip knew
or should have known that there was a breach of a duty based on the source
of the information.4 '
A. Analyzing the Second Circuit's Interpretation of Personal Benefits
following Dirks v. SEC
In the seminal Supreme Court case, Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court
held that a prosecutor could charge tippees with insider trading liability if
he or she met two conditions: 1) if the tip recipient had reason to believe
that when the information was divulged, it was in violation of another's
fiduciary duty; and 2) if the recipient personally gained from acting upon
42the information. In Dirks, the petitioner worked as a securities analyst at
an insurance company. An insider at an investment company urged the
petitioner to investigate the investment company after the insider received
information that the company was engaging in fraud.43  The petitioner
confirmed the fraud by interviewing other corporate employees 4 In the
course of the investigation, neither the petitioner nor his firm traded any
40. E.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) (noting that the duty to disclose
does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information, rather it
arises from the existence of a fiduciary relationship); see also Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1980) (holding that no duty to disclose could arise since
petitioner was not an agent, fiduciary, or person in whom the sellers had placed their
trust and confidence).
41. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 ("A tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders
of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider
has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know there has been a breach.").
42. See id. (noting that the Supreme Court was not suggesting that all tippees were
free to trade on material nonpublic information but that a tippee's duty to disclose or
abstain must be derived from the insider's duty).
43. See id. at 649.
44. See id. (noting that Dirks interviewed several officers and employees of the
corporation and the senior management denied any wrongdoing but that certain
corporation employees corroborated the charges of fraud).
2015
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
stock from the company; however, the petitioner did discuss his findings
with a number of clients who in turn sold their holdings.4 5 As a result, the
company's stock fell, causing the New York Stock Exchange to halt
trading.4 6
The SEC found that the petitioner had aided and abetted violations of
United States' securities laws, and it censured him.47 The Supreme Court
reversed the SEC's judgment and reaffirmed its decision in Chiarella v.
United States, holding that a duty to disclose "arises from the relationship
between parties ... and not merely from one's ability to acquire
information because of his position in the market., 48 The Supreme Court
also held that, because the tippers were only motivated by a desire to
expose the fraud, there was no personal benefit to the tippers and thus no
derivative liability for the petitioner-tippee. 49 In Dirks, the Supreme Court
found that the petitioner had no fiduciary duty to the shareholders or
officers of the investment company nor was there expectation by the
petitioner's source of information that he would keep the information
confidential. 50 Furthermore, because the petitioner did not misappropriate
or illegally obtain the information, the Supreme Court found that there was
no actionable violation.51
Since Dirks, the Second Circuit has interpreted the Dirks "personal
benefit test" differently. In United States v. Rajaratnam and United States
v. Whitman, the Second Circuit interpreted Dirks to require that the
Government prove a tippee's knowledge of a benefit to the tipper who
violated a fiduciary duty.52 However, in United States v. Jiau and United
45. See id.
46. See id. at 650.
47. See id. at 650-52.
48. See id. at 657-58 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980),
which rejected the SEC's position that anyone who knowingly receives nonpublic,
material information from an insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading).
49. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-67 (requiring courts to focus on an objective
criterion, "i.e. whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from
disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into
future earnings").
50. See id. at 665.
51. See id.
52. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 158 n. 23 (2d Cir. 2013)
(holding that "when an unlawful tip occurs, the tippee is ... liable if he knows or
should know that the information was received from one who breached a fiduciary duty
and the tippee traders or tips for personal benefit with the requisite scienter"); United
States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that to be
criminally liable for insider trading, a secondary tippee must have a general
understanding that the inside information was obtained from an insider who breached a
duty of confidentiality in exchange for some personal benefit and that the tippee must
Vol. 5:1
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States v. Libera, the Second Circuit interpreted Dirks to require that the
Government principally prove that the tipper received some benefit but that
the Government did not have to prove that the tippee had knowledge of that
benefit. 3 The Second Circuit's decision in Newman offers a different
interpretation of Dirks and brings clarity to an otherwise vague
interpretation of establishing personal benefits. Prior to the Newman
decision, the legal community has described the personal benefit element
for tipper/tippee liability as "broadly defined.,
54
B. Comparing Tippee Liability through the Classical and
Misappropriation Theories
In Newman, the Second Circuit and prosecutors assessed the Defendant's
liability through different theories of liability, and after the Second Circuit
put forth its decision, New York judges began to follow suit.5 5 With this
large-scale response, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") quickly sought to
curb Newman's effect by arguing that the decision only applied to
"classical" insider trading cases and not to cases brought under the
"misappropriation" theory.56 However, the elements of tipping liability are
the same regardless of whether the tipper's duty arose under the classical or
have a specific intent to defraud the company to which the information relates).
53. See United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that "[t]he
existence of 'a relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid
pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the [latter]' may be sufficient to
justify an inference of personal benefit." (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664)); United States
v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993) (implying that the breach of a fiduciary
duty in return for some benefit was required to establish liability; it is not necessary to
establish that the tipper must specifically know that their breach of a fiduciary duty will
lead to trading.).
54. See United States v. Newman: Second Circuit Clarifies Its "Delphic"
Interpretation of Insider Trading Laws in Landmark Ruling, NIXON PEABODY LLP
(Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/172497 GIWCAlert1 lDEC
2014.pdf (suggesting that the Second Circuit's decision in Newman "brings case law
back in line with the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC, which noted that not
all disclosures of confidential information exposes the tipper to securities laws
violation").
55. See e.g., United States v. Conradt, No. 12-cr-887, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16263,
at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2015) (noting that the presiding judge rejected the
government's argument that any reference to the misappropriation theory in Newman
was dicta and that prior Second Circuit decisions have held that the misappropriation
theory does not require the tipper to receive any personal benefit to be liable for insider
trading).
56. Id.; see also Gov't's Mem. Law Supp. Suff. Defs.' Guilty Pleas at 1, 4, United
States v. Durant, No. 12-cr-887 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2015) (explaining the DOJ's
position that because the Durant prosecution is founded on the "misappropriation"
theory of insider trading, and Newman involved a prosecution based on the "classical"
theory of insider trading, the Newman holding will not affect the Durant case).
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the misappropriation theory.57
The Supreme Court endorsed the classical theory of insider trading in the
1980 case, Chiarella v. United States. Under the classical theory, a
corporate insider violates the anti-fraud provision by trading a
corporation's securities "on the basis of material, nonpublic information"
about the corporation. 58 In Chiarella, the petitioner was convicted by the
Second Circuit for violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
and SEC Rule lob-5.5 9 While working for a financial printer, the petitioner
handled announcements of corporate takeover bids.60 Without disclosing
his knowledge, the petitioner purchased the targeted company stock and
sold the shares immediately after the takeover attempts were publicized.61
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had not violated the duty to
disclose material information because no relationship of trust or confidence
existed between petitioner and the shareholders.
62
Chiarella limited the scope of insider trading liability to individuals who
not only possessed material, nonpublic information but also to those who
possessed a duty to disclose based on a relationship of trust and confidence
63between the parties. Since Chiarella, however, the Courts no longer
limited the duty to disclose or abstain under the classical theory to
"traditional" corporate insiders, such as officers and directors. The
Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC extended the duty to disclose or abstain to
outsiders who can obtain status as "temporary insiders."
64
A defendant is guilty of violating the misappropriation theory when he
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in
breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.65 Unlike the
57. Id.; see also SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that
"[o]ne who has a fiduciary duty of trust and confidence to shareholders (classical
theory) or to a source of confidential information (misappropriation theory) and is in
receipt of material non-public information has a duty to abstain from trading or to
disclose the information publicly").
58. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
59. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225 (1980).
60. Id. at 224.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 232-33.
63. Bainbridge, supra note 23, at 52.
64. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); see also Insider Trading: A Primer,
KATTENMUCHINROSENMAN LLP (Oct. 26, 2009), https://www.kattenlaw.com/Insider-
Trading-A-Primer-10-26-2009 (explaining that a temporary insider is someone who
enters into a special confidential relationship with an issuer, and as a result is given
access to confidential relationship).
65. See Kramer Ortman, SEC v. Bauer: If the Glove Fits, It's Insider Trading, 63
CATH. U.L. REV. 1075, 1082 (2014) (stating that under the misappropriation theory, "a
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classical theory, the misappropriation theory imposes a duty on corporate
"outsiders." In United States v. O'Hagan, the respondent-attorney
purchased common stock and call options of a potential takeover target
based upon nonpublic information. 66  During the representation, the
respondent purchased call options for the other company's stock and sold
those options at a significant profit. 67 Because the respondent was neither
an officer nor had any relation to the target company, the classical theory of
insider trading did not apply. However, the Supreme Court held that the
respondent was guilty of insider trading because he owed a fiduciary duty
to his law firm, and when he used his law firm's confidential information to
trade, he misappropriated such information to the disadvantage of his
firm.68 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that a corporate outsider is
guilty of insider trading "when he misappropriates confidential
information.., in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of
information."
69
Courts no longer restrict insider trading to either "corporate insiders" or
to "corporate outsiders." Instead courts have expanded insider trading
liability to include both insiders ("the tipper") in possession of the material,
nonpublic information, and outsiders ("the tippee") who receive the
information from the insider and use the information received to trade.7 )
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF UNITED STATES V. NEWMAN
Defendants Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson (collectively
"Defendants") appealed their convictions, entered by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, following a trial on
charges of conspiracy to commit insider trading in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
371, § 10(b) and § 32 of the Securities Exchange Act, SEC Rules lOb-5
and 10b5-2, and 18 U.S.C. § 2.71 The Second Circuit reversed the lower
court's convictions and held that the Government failed to present
sufficient evidence that the Defendants willfully engaged in substantive
fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase or sell
securities in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of
the exclusive use of that information").
66. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1977).
67. Id.
68. See id. at 653-54, 666.
69. Id. at 652.
70. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983) (stating that "not only are insiders
forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate
information to their advantage, but they may not give such information to an outsider
for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information to their personal gain").
71. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2014).
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insider trading or in a conspiracy to commit insider trading in violation of
federal securities laws.72
On January 18, 2012, the Government unsealed charges against the
Defendants and several other investment professionals.73 This case focused
on the Government's accusation that the Defendants were liable for insider
trading after they received information from financial analysts about Dell
Inc. ("Dell") and Nvidia Corporation's ("Nvidia") earning numbers before
the numbers were publicly released by the corporations and, using that
information, executed trade deals. 74 However, the Defendants were several
steps removed from the corporate insiders, and there was no evidence that
either was aware of the source of the inside information7 5
The Government alleged that the Defendants were "criminally liable for
insider trading because, as sophisticated traders, they should have known
that the information was disclosed by insiders in breach of a fiduciary duty,
and not for any legitimate corporate purpose., 76 On the other hand, counsel
for the Defendants argued that there was no evidence that the corporate
insiders provided inside information in exchange for a personal benefit,
which was required by law to establish tipper liability.
77
The district court instructed the jury to consider whether the Government
had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendants knew the
information they received was originally disclosed by an insider, in
78
violation of a duty of confidentiality. On December 17, 2012, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty on all counts, and the Defendants appealed the
verdict.
79
72. Id. at 442.
73. Id. at 443.
74. Id. (stating that Newman and Chiasson earned approximately $4 million and
$68 million respectively in profits after receiving the inside information from their
portfolio managers).
75. Id. But see Petition of the United States for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
at 6-7, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837)
[hereinafter United States Petition Rehearing En Banc] (describing purposeful steps
Newman and Chiasson took to avoid learning where the real source of information
came from that they in return traded on and made a profit from).
76. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443-44.
77. Id. at 444 (asserting that in the defendant's case, because a tippee's liability
derives from the liability of the tipper, defendants could not be held liable since no
personal benefit was found).
78. See id. (stating further that "[t]he mere receipt of material, nonpublic
information by a defendant, and even trading on that information, is not sufficient; he
must have known that it was originally disclosed by the insider in violation of a duty of
confidentiality").
79. Id.
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On appeal, the Second Circuit held that to sustain an insider trading
conviction against the tippee, the Government must prove each of the
following: 1) the corporation entrusted the insider with a fiduciary duty; 2)
the corporate insider breached his fiduciary duty by (a) disclosing
confidential information to a tippee (b) in exchange for a personal benefit;
3) the tippee knew of the tipper's breach of fiduciary duty; and 4) the
tippee still used that information to trade in a security or further tip another
individual for personal benefit. 80 The Second Circuit concluded that the
Government's evidence of casual acquaintances between a tipper and
tippee, as well as offers of generic career advice and occasional socializing,
was insufficient to prove the necessary personal benefit to the insider. 8 1
Instead, the Second Circuit found that the Government could infer a benefit
only upon "proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature."8 2 The
Second Circuit also found that the Defendants did not know of any benefit
received by the tipper. The Court vacated the convictions and remanded
the case to the district court to dismiss the indictments with prejudice as
they pertained to the Defendants.
8 3
III. NEWMAN'S AFTERMATH: ANALYZING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION
In overturning the defendant's convictions, the Second Circuit presented
a much-needed return to fairness and "sanity" in the judicial system. 84 U.S.
80. Newman, 773 F.3d at 448 (rejecting the government's contention "that
knowledge of a breach of the duty of confidentiality without knowledge of the personal
benefit is sufficient to impose criminal liability").
81. Id. at 452 (stating that if Court were to accept that two individuals who were
alumni of the same school or attended the same church as a personal benefit, then the
personal benefit requirement would be a void and any relationship can be inferred as a
personal benefit).
82. Id. But see United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding
that "personal benefit is broadly defined to include not only pecuniary gain, but also,
inter alia, any reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings").
83. Newman, 773 F.3d at 455.
84. See Stephen Bainbridge, U.S. v. Newman: A Big Win for Coherence and
Fairness in Insider Trading Law, PROFESSOR BAINBRIDGE (Dec. 11, 2014, 12:49 PM),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/12/us-v-newman-
a-big-win-for-coherence-and-fairness-in-insider-trading-law.html (agreeing with the
Second Circuit's interpretation of law and stating that "Bharara's crusade has destroyed
lives and ruined businesses by deploying highly aggressive 'interpretations' of the law
that lacked a firm foundation in existing law"); see also Charles Gasparino, Preet's
Overreach: Insider-Trading-Case Slapdown, N.Y. POST (Dec. 11, 2014, 7:53 PM),
http://nypost.com/2014/12/1I/preets-overreach-insider-trading-case-slapdown/
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Attorney Preet Bharara has racked up more than eighty successful insider
85trading convictions in the past seven years, providing him with an
impressive track record and earning himself the reputation as the sheriff of
Wall Street.86 To some critics, Bharara's prosecution of insider trading has
focused on successfully arguing that traders "didn't really have to know
that the information they were trading on was the illegal variety.
87
Instead, it was good enough for prosecutors to establish that traders should
have known the information was illegal88 and to rely on something as
nebulous as friendship to prove the existence of a benefit in lieu of
providing that traders paid off their sources to obtain the illegal
information." The Newman decision successfully puts an end to Bharara's
overreaching prosecution of insider trading and reminds the Government
that not everyone who trades on nonpublic information is guilty of insider
trading.
After Newman, the Second Circuit's decision forces the Government and
prosecutors to reconsider bringing cases against remote tippees for trading
insider information.9" Now prosecutors' focus on insider trading are
directed much more towards guilt than money. 91 Under Newman, liability
would arise from the insider's intent to benefit the person who receives the
inside information: the tippee.92 Therefore, a tipper who trades based on
(suggesting that Bharara's "bogus legal reasoning" behind convicting Newman and
Chiasson stems from the pressure to convict individuals in an attempt to prove to the
public that Wall Street is being held accountable for the damage that led to the 2008
financial crisis).
85. See Preet Bharara's Key Insider Trading Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/09/business/dealbook/09insider-
timeline.html? r-0#/#time337_8872 (highlighting some of Bharara's key cases from
the eighty-five secured convictions and guilty pleas from traders, analysts, and industry
consultants).
86. See An Outside the Law Prosecutor, supra note 11.
87. See Gasparino, supra note 84.
88. Id.; see also Newman, 773 F.3d at 443-44 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting the
Government's argument that Newman and Chiasson were criminally liable for insider
trading because, as sophisticated traders, they should have known the information they
were trading on was illegal).
89. See Gasparino, supra note 84.
90. See Henning, supra note 5 (stating that the DOJ is fighting to minimize the
impact of the opinion, which raised the bar on what the government must show to
establish a violation for trading on confidential information).
91. See Matt Levine, What's Next for Insider Trading Law?, BLOOMBERG VIEW
(Dec. 11, 2014, 6:17 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-12-1 1/whats-
next-for-insider-trading-law (stating "if you provably [sic] knew that you were
corruptly obtaining information, then you go to jail, but if you just made a lot of money
trading and got some tainted tips, you just have to give the money back").
92. See Mark S. Nelson, SEC to Back U.S. Attorney's Try to Upend Newman, SEC.
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inside information must then give the illegal gains to a friend to be guilty of
insider trading.
93
A. Heightened Standard Analysis
Although the Newman case comes as a blow to prosecutors for future
insider trading cases, it clarifies the muddled standards for establishing
tippee liability within the Second Circuit. 94 In the past, the Second Circuit
has articulated two opposing rationales for establishing personal benefit. In
some cases, the Court construed Dirks to require that the government prove
a tippee's knowledge of a benefit to the tipper who violated a fiduciary
duty; 95 however, in others, the Court viewed Dirks as requiring the
government to prove that the tipper received some benefit but that it did not
have to not prove that the tippee knew of that benefit.
96
The Newman decision correctly reins in both a prosecutor's ability to
bring cases involving insider trading and his or her ability to target remote
tippees whose actions are tangentially related to the illegal activity. In
Newman, the Government continued to overextend insider trading
culpability precedent set by courts by relying heavily on prior dicta
favorable to their position, instead of analyzing tippee liability in view of
the courts' framework.97
The Court in Newman correctly rejected the Government's argument that
it only had to prove that the Defendants traded on material, nonpublic
information that they knew insiders had disclosed in breach of a duty of
confidentiality.98 Instead, the Court ruled that the Defendants were guilty
of insider trading if they were aware that insiders at technology companies
were improperly leaking confidential information to hedge funds in
exchange for some personal benefit.99 While the Defendants profited from
REG. DAILY (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.dailyreportingsuite.com/securities/news/
sec to back u s attorney_s try toupendnewman.
93. See id.
94. Protess, supra note 10 (concluding that the appellate decision "drew a new and
more defined line that curtails the boundaries of insider trading liability").
95. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v.
Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993).
97. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 448 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting the
Government's reliance on insider trading cases involving "tippees who directly
participated in the tippers breach" and applying these cases to insider trading
prosecutions of "remote tippees many levels removed from corporate insiders").
98. See id. at 447-48 (demonstrating that the Government cites Dirks for the
proposition that the Supreme Court only required that the "tippee know that the tipper
disclosed information in breach of a duty" (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660)).
99. See id. at 438.
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the nonpublic information, the Court found the Defendants so far removed
from the initial tips at Dell and NVIDIA that they could not have known of
any breach of fiduciary duty in exchange for a benefit. 100 The Newman
decision is important for convicting remote tippees for the crime of insider
trading because it defines the mens rea required for insider trading, namely
that the defendant knew of the breach of fiduciary duty for a personal
benefit. In Newman, the Defendants were four or five people removed
from the original source of the inside information. The Court believed this
was similar to a situation where a trader, who receives a tip and trades on it,
is unaware that his conduct is wrongful because he was unaware of the
original source. 10 1
This heightened standard imposes the highest burden on the Government
and forces prosecutors to reconsider its decision to charge tippees with
unmerited accusations. Prosecutors argue that the Newman ruling
encourages "higher-ranking traders to distance themselves from insider
trading leaks, even when reaping big profits from the tips.", 0 2 However, in
the case of Newman, it is plausible to believe that the Defendants did not
know the information was traded on a nonpublic basis for a personal
benefit. What started as an illegal tip-exchanged between insiders at the
technology companies-wound its way through a network of traders and
then reached the Defendants, who were at the end of a long chain of
traders. 103
B. Personal Benefits Analysis
In the Newman decision, the Second Circuit revisited the Supreme
Court's Dirks' "personal benefit" definition, and it added an unprecedented
limitation that now drastically limits the Government's ongoing, frivolous
prosecution of remote tippees. As mentioned above, in Dirks, the Supreme
Court held that a breach of fiduciary duty was a breach of confidentiality in
exchange for a personal benefit. 104 It further explained that the tipper's
breach of fiduciary duty required that the tipper "[will] personally benefit,
directly or indirectly, from his disclosure."'
0 5
100. But see United States Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 75, at 21
(arguing that the record established that the information the defendants received,
namely top-line earnings numbers "were different in kind from any arguably authorized
leaks from the subject companies").
101. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 450 (discussing the requisite mens rea for insider
trading convictions).
102. Protess, supra note 10.
103. Id.
104. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983).
105. Id. at 662.
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In the past, prosecutors have successfully argued that mere friendship is
enough to prove that a tipper received an indirect benefit from passing on
an illegal tip to a friend. 0 6 However, post-Newman, the Government will
have to prove 1) the existence of "a meaningfully close personal
relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and
represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary of similarly valuable
nature," 10 7 and 2) that, as stated above, the tippee had knowledge that the
tipper received some benefit for the information shared in breach of a
fiduciary duty. 108
In Newman, the Government argued that the benefit received for the Dell
insiders who worked together-and who previously attended business
school together-was career advice. °9 The Government also attempted to
establish personal benefits in the NVIDIA tipping chain by arguing that the
insiders were close friends who socialized and attended church together." 0
The Second Circuit deemed the Government's evidence of personal benefit
insufficient to establish insider trading liability."' After the Second
Circuit's decision in Newman, the Court affirmed the basis for a claim of
fraudulent breach, namely that the Government must also show that the
tipper's gain "received in exchange for confidential information must be of
some consequence. ' 1 2 Further, the Newman court set a high evidentiary
burden for the Government by expressly declaring that, without direct
proof of a tippee's knowledge of a benefit to the tipper, such knowledge
may not be inferred by virtue of a personal relationship between the tipper
and tippee.
106. See, e.g., SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285 (2d Cir. 2012) ("Personal benefit to
the tipper is broadly defined: it includes not only 'pecuniary gain,' such as a cut of the
take or a gratuity from the tippee, but also a 'reputational benefit' or the benefit one
would obtain from simply 'mak[ing] a gift of confidential information to a trading
relative or friend."' (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. at 663-64 (1983)); see also SEC v.
Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding a sufficient showing of personal
benefit where a "close friendship" suggested that the tip was intended to benefit the
tippee). See generally Protess, supra note 10.
107. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining that
this often manifests in "a relationship between the insider and the recipient that
suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the [latter]").
108. Id. at 448.
109. Id. at 452-53.
110. United States Petition for Rehearing En Bane, supra note 75, at 6.
111. Newman, 773 F.3d at 455 (stating that "where the evidence viewed in the light
most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to
a theory of innocence as a theory of guilt, that evidence necessarily fails to establish
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt").
112. Id.at452.
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The Court's decision stating that mere friendship is no longer sufficient
evidence of a personal benefit heightens the standard for establishing
personal benefit. However, the Second Circuit needs a further step to
clarify what type of evidence then satisfies this heightened standard.' 13 The
defense counsel can assert that anything short of a wiretap or coerced
information from an informant-that proves the existence of a mutually
beneficial friendship-does not satisfy the form of evidence to establish
liability.' 14
The Second Circuit's established heightened standard in Newman draws
a somewhat clearer line for the requirements of insider trading liability, and
it provides a framework to determine what qualifies as a "personal benefit."
In the past, the Second Circuit has faced some confusion on tippee liability,
which may have contributed to the Government's successful ability to
charge virtually anyone with insider trading so long as he or she traded
using material, nonpublic information.' 15 Yet, since the Supreme Court's
decision in Dirks v. SEC, the Second Circuit has struggled to define what
constitutes a "personal benefit." As a result of the "delphic" '1 16 discussion
on the type of personal benefits necessary to establish tippee liability, the
Government has been able to pick and choose from the dicta that provide
the strongest support for its case.'1 The Newman decision correctly
reinforces that tippee liability is established by the tippee when he or she
knows the information on which he or she is trading was acquired through
a breach of a fiduciary duty in exchange for a meaningful personal benefit.
As the Second Circuit concludes, if the Court were to hold that the
Government's proof of personal benefit was established through casual
friendships and career advice, then practically anything would qualify as a
113. Brief of Petitioner for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 14, United States
v. Newman, F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837) ("It is best uncertain how courts
would determine the evidence necessary to satisfy such a standard.").
114. See Protess, supra note 10 (quoting Jonathan R. Streeter, a lawyer at Dechert
who was one of the prosecutors under Bharara in the case of United States v.
Rajaratnam: "It used to be all the government had to do to prove a benefit was show
the people involved were friends-and now they must show a tangible benefit, and
that's a big change").
115. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 448 (addressing what the court terms as "the
doctrinal novelty of [the Government's] recent insider trading prosecutions," especially
those targeting remote tippees); see also Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan Sack,
Implications of Reversal of Insider Trading Convictions; White-Collar Crime, N.Y. L.J.
(Jan. 6, 2015) (suggesting that the Court believes the Government was essentially
attempting to pin liability on the defendants based on "informational asymmetry").
116. Newman, 773 F.3d at 447.
117. Id.
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benefit. 1 8
Newman presents an even stricter return to the Dirks holding, with the
Second Circuit concluding that, "in order to sustain a conviction for insider
trading, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
tippee knew that an insider disclosed confidential information and that he
did so in exchange for a personal benefit."" 9  The Court rejected the
Government's argument that they can impose liability can be imposed upon
a defendant, based solely on the knowledge of a breach of fiduciary duty.
If the Government's request for an en banc rehearing is successful, then the
prosecutors may argue that a broader interpretation of Dirks should be the
standard for establishing a personal benefit. However, this argument will
likely fail because it seeks to continue the Government's track record of
picking and choosing case law interpretations beneficial to their position.
20
Ultimately, the Government's request for an en banc rehearing was denied
by the Second Circuit, and the Government filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari on July 30, 2015.122 The Supreme Court denied certiorari with no
explanation on October 5, 2015.12' As of now, the Newman decision firmly
establishes that the Government must show that the tippee knew of the
personal benefit gained by the tipper in breach of a fiduciary duty.
C. The Future of Insider Trading Cases Post-Newman
The Second Circuit's decision in Newman will undoubtedly curb the
number of cases the Government plans to pursue for insider trading. On
the heels of the Newman decision, the Defendants who were former
employees of Wells Fargo, and who shared inside information of a
forthcoming ratings change via e-mail, have now requested the SEC's
118. Id.at452.
119. Id. at 442.
120. See id. at 447.
121. See Second Circuit Rebuffs DOJ and SEC in Denying Rehearing in Newman
Insider Trading Case, THE NAT'L LAW REV. (April 6, 2015), http://www.nat
lawreview.com/article/second-circuit-rebuffs-doj-and-sec-denying-rehearing-newman-
insider-trading-case.
122. See Stephanie Russell-Kraft, DOJ Appeals Insider Trading Ruling to High
Court, Law 360 (July 30, 2015, 11:33 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
685289/doj-appeals-insider-trading-ruling-to-high-court (noting Solicitor General
Verrilli's opinion that the Second Circuit's decision "threatens to destabilize the law
elsewhere").
123. See Matthew Goldstein & Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Denies Request to
Hear Insider Trading Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/10/06/business/dealbook/supreme-court-denies-request-to-hear-insider-trading-
case.html.
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dismissal of administrative charges. 124  The Defendants alleged that the
benefit was only "their friendship and positive feedback given to the
tipper's managers." 125 The SEC contended that the Defendants gave two
traders a "sneak preview into [the] upcoming ratings changes and provided
them an unfair and illegal advantage on the rest of the markets.' 26 Post-
Newman, the Defendants have filed motions to dismiss, stating that the
SEC's case is "fatally flawed in light of the appeal-court ruling, because the
agency can't show . . . [that] the former Wells Fargo analyst, tipped for a
personal benefit."' 127  Ruggieri's case was ultimately dismissed, and the
judge held that while the SEC established that the defendant traded on tips
he received, there was no proof that the tipper in this case received
anything of benefit.' 
28
In another case, United States v. Conradt, the Government accused five
friends of illegally trading based on a secondhand tip about IBM's plan to
acquire SPSS, a software company, for $1.2 billion in 2009.129 In Conradt,
the Government argued that the defendant, Trent Martin received an
124. See Jean Eaglesham, Bros or Insider Traders? Ex-Wells Fargo Colleagues
Seek to Dismiss SEC Case, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2015, 2:03 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/01/12/bros-or-insider-traders-ex-wells-fargo-
colleagues-seek-to-dismiss-sec-case/ (explaining that the defendant's seek dismissal of
the SEC's civil case against them because it fails to meet the standards set out in
Newman for proving illegal activity). See generally In the Matter of Gregory T. Bolan,
Jr. and Joseph C. Ruggieri, SEC Release No. 34-75066, 2015 WL 3413279 (May 28,
2015), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/33-9795.pdf.
125. See Henning, supra note 5; see also Press Release, Two Former Wells Fargo
Employees Charged with Insider Trade in Advance of Research Reports Containing
Rating Changes (Sept. 29, 2014) (on file with author),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543065774#.VMKT
TUfF-M [hereinafter "SEC Press Release on Wells Fargo Employees"] (stating that
Bolan Jr.'s tips to Ruggieri, in advance of several market-moving ratings, allowed
Ruggieri to generate over $117,000 in profits).
126. See SEC Press Release on Wells Fargo Employees, supra note 125.
127. See Eaglesham, supra note 124.
128. See Nate Raymond, Update 2 Ex- Wells Fargo Trader Beats SEC Insider
Trading Charges, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2015, 5:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2015/09/14/usa-insidertrading-wellsfargo-idUSL IN 11K 1MU20150914#VItRJ 1 dTxul5
f02K.97.
129. United States v. Conradt, No. 12 Cr. 887 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2015); see also
Walter Pavlo, IBM Insider Trading Guilty Pleas Tossed Amid Conflicting Gov't
Positions, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2015, 12:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/
2015/01/23/ibm-insider-trading-guilty-pleas-tossed-amid-conflicting-govt-positions/
print/; Nate Raymond, U.S. Judge Throws Out Insider Trading Guilty Pleas Over IBM
Deal, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2015, 6:18 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/
22/us-usa-insidertrading-ibm-idUSKBNOKV2KX20150122 (stating that an employee
of IBM's law firm told the Defendant, Trent Martin about the company's plan to
acquire SPSS Inc. for $1.2 billion).
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"indirect gift of confidential information."' 130 On January 29, 2015, U.S.
District Judge Andrew Carter granted U.S. prosecutors' request to drop
insider trading charges against the five defendants but allowed the
government to reassert its charges if it successfully challenged Newman.'13
During a hearing, the prosecutors stated that "they couldn't prove their case
under a new framework that was set by a pivotal appeals court ruling in
December," referring to Newman.132 They further stated that the Newman
decision would "dramatically limit the [G]ovemment's ability to prosecute
some of the most common culpable and market threatening forms of insider
trading."' 33 The IBM case is the first case prosecutors dropped following
the Newman decision, and it could potentially provide a road map for
others challenging the Government in future cases concerning insider
trading. 1
34
As demonstrated above, Newman's requirement of a "meaningful
benefit" has already forced both courts and the prosecutors to reconsider
cases where there is not enough evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendants are liable for insider trading. The Newman
decision puts an end to the Government's recent crusade against insider
trading, 135 where the Government has frequently stretched precedent and
presented scant evidence that, taken together, formed legally conclusory
cases. 136 In the case of remote tippees, the Second Circuit has correctly
required the Government to prove its case with solid evidence
demonstrating that the defendants knew of a breach of fiduciary duty in
exchange for a personal benefit amounting to more than just a casual
130. See Pavlo, supra note 129.
131. See Ed Beeson, Judge to Dismiss IBM Insider Trading Case at Fed's Request,
LAw360 (Jan. 29, 2015, 11:27 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/616277/judge-to-
dismiss-ibm-insider-trading-case-at-feds-request.
132. Christoper M. Matthews, Insider-Trading Charges to Be Dropped, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 29, 2015, 7:31 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-drops-
insider-trading-charges-1422571552.
133. Id.
134. Id.; see also Gregory T. Bolan, Jr., SEC Release No. 877, 2015 WL 5316569
(Sept. 14, 2015).
135. See An Outside the Law Prosecutor, supra note 11 (opining that the Newman
reversal finally put a judicial cap to Bharara's quest to expand the definition of "insider
trading" to capture nearly every information asymmetry and virtual presumption of
guilt).
136. Chung, supra note 7 (stating that, until the Newman decision, "the Government
had chipped away at the Dirks benefit test, including by deeming the test satisfied
where the tip was in exchange for "maintaining a useful networking contact" (citing
United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)) or merely
"making a gift of information to a friend" (citing SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 291 (2d
Cir. 2012)).
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friendship.
The Second Circuit's decision in Newman directly impacted another
major case, United States v. Steinberg.'37 Michael Steinberg, the former
portfolio manager of S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P. ("SAC Capital"), was
convicted in 2013 after a jury found him guilty of generating $1.9 million
in illegal profits for SAC Capital. 138 The Southern District of New York
sentenced him to three-and-a-half years in prison for conspiracy to commit
securities fraud and four counts of securities fraud. 139 In light of the new
Newman standard for charging remote tippees with insider trading,
Steinberg's conviction will likely be overturned by the Government
because he traded part of the same information that did not constitute an
illegal tip for the Defendants in Newman. 40 Others who plead guilty and
testified as cooperating witnesses in the trials of the Defendants and
Steinberg may also seek to withdraw their guilty pleas. 141
Contrary to the Government's belief, the Newman decision does not
shield hedge fund managers from liability when trading on confidential
information they receive, by claiming they did not know the identity of the
original source. 142 The Government can bring a successful claim of remote
insider trading liability by proving that a person knowingly ignored red
flags about the questionable nature of the information and did not avoid
learning too much: also known as "the ostrich instruction."' 143 The Newman
137. United States v. Steinberg, 21 F. Supp. 3d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Press
Release, U.S. Den't of Justice, SAC Capital Portfolio Manager Michael Steinberg
Found Guilty In Manhattan Federal Court Of Insider Trading Charges (Dec. 18, 2013)
(on file with author), http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/sac-capital-portfolio-
manager-michael-steinberg-found-guilty-manhattan-federal-court [hereinafter DOJ
Press Release on SAC Capital].
138. See DOJ Press Release on SAC Capital, supra note 137.
139. Id.; see also Matthew Goldstein, Ex-Trader at SAC Fund is Sentenced to 3
Years, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2014, 12:55 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/
16/ex-sac-capital-trader-steinberg-sentenced-to-3-12-years/?_r-0 (quoting Judge
Sullivan stating that Steinberg's prison sentence and $2 million fine, "was necessary to
send a message to others on Wall Street that insider trading is not a trivial crime").
140. See Goldstein, supra note 139.
141. Henning, supra note 5.
142. See Peter J. Henning, What an Appeals Court Insider Trading Decision Does
and Doesn't Do, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2014, 7:07 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/12/10/what-an-appeals-court-insider-trading-decision-does-and-doesnt-do/
(stating that the government can prove a case of remote tippee liability through a
person's "willful blindness").
143. See United States v. Goffer, 721 F.3d 113, 124-27 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding
that evidence relating to knowledge and conscious avoidance in tipping chain cases was
sufficient to establish tippee scienter); see also id. (explaining that the "ostrich
instruction" allows a jury to find defendants "can violate the law by putting their heads
in the sand when it came to knowing how the information was obtained").
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ruling puts pressure on the DOJ and the SEC to show that there was
something more tangible passed to the tipper by the tippee than just the
"warm feeling" of helping out a friend. 144 However, cases in which a
tippee directly gave something of value to a tipper will be largely
unaffected. 1
45
Ultimately, the Newman prosecution presents a "problematic theme in
the recent government policy of pursuing the end users of inside
information rather than the source."' 14 6 As the Newman Court noted, the
Government has not yet charged the corporate insiders that leaked the
material, nonpublic information with insider trading.1
47
IV. TIME TO MAKE SOME LAWS, CONGRESS
The absence of laws, directly criminalizing insider trading, leaves
loopholes in securities law to the advantage of defendants when they are
appealing convictions of insider trading. Although the SEC designed
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act as a catch-all clause to
prevent fraud, it does not prohibit insider trading. Instead, the Government
has used Section 10(b) to prosecute cases by rationalizing that insider
trading is a type of securities fraud proscribed by Section 10(b) and SEC
Rule lOb-5. The lack of laws specifically tailored to insider trading has
essentially allowed judges to wield insider trading precedents the way they
see fit.
In these cases, it is important to keep in mind the big picture; investors
are being prosecuted by the government for conduct that Congress is either
unwilling or unable to define. And, if this is not troublesome enough, the
144. See Matt Levine, Appeals Court Not So Keen On Insider Trading Crackdown,
Bloomberg View (Dec. 10, 2014, 1:36 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/
2014-12-1 0/appeals-court-not-so-keen-on-insider-trading-crackdown.
145. See generally United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 160 (2d Cir. 2013)
(holding the defendant guilty of insider trading where the government had sufficient
information to prove the defendant received tips personally from insiders and provided
money and other benefits to them).
146. Jill E. Fisch, Newman Reins in Criminal Prosecution of Remote Tippees for
Insider Trading, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/01/ 2 8/newman-reins-in-criminal-prosecution-
of-remote-tippees-for-insider-trading/; see also R. Todd Cronan, Second Circuit Raises
the Bar for Government Insider Trading Prosecutions- Practical Implications for the
Business Community, GOODWIN PROCTOR LLP (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.goodwin
procter.com/Publications/Newsletters/Client-Alert/2014/1215_Second-Circuit-Raises-
the-Bar-for-Government-Insider-Trading-Prosecutions.aspx?article= I (stating that
"[o]ver the last few years, the Government has chosen to prosecute high-profile remote
tippees without ever criminally pursuing the original source").
147. Cronan, supra note 146.
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DOJ and the SEC continue to prosecute insider trading cases while
simultaneously aiming to expand the boundaries of insider trading on
theories that lack precedent. 148 Prosecutors have lost sight of their initial
goal-improving the fairness of the markets for investors-and instead,
they have crusaded against big corporations and hedge fund managers in a
half-hearted effort to mitigate insider trading.
149
The implications of these frivolous crusades are that investors begin to
pull back from market participation for fear of becoming the next victim of
overzealous prosecutors. This outcome is why it is crucial for Congress to
clearly define what constitutes insider trading activity. Congress has had
the opportunity to address insider trading on numerous occasions in the
past, but it has repeatedly declined to do so. 150 While the SEC can refine its
rules, it would be far more effective for Congress to take the lead and make
laws defining and criminalizing insider trading.15 1  As Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote last year in the denial to grant writ of
certiorari for Whitman v. United States, "Congress cannot, through
ambiguity, effectively leave that function [of defining crimes and fixing
punishments] to the courts-much less to an administrative
bureaucracy."
1 52
148. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 448 (2d Cir. 2014) ("[T]he
Government's overreliance on our prior dicta merely highlights the doctrinal novelty of
its recent insider trading prosecutions [ .... ]").
149. See Cronan, supra note 146 (citing the Newman decision as "some good news
for the financial industry, especially hedge funds, arbitrage funds, and other financial
entities, that may come into possession of information about public companies where it
is difficult to determine if the information is non-public and where the ultimate source
is unknown and may be several steps removed from the trader himself').
150. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational
Securities Market, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 375, 382 n. 1l (1987) (suggesting Congress
specifically declined to define insider trading, while passing the Insider Trading
Sanctions Acts of 1984, to avoid a debate over the definition that could have stalled
passage of the entire legislative package); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 11 (1988)
(demonstrating Congress' refusal to adopt a definition of insider trading when it
enacted the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 because
"the court-drawn parameters of insider trading have established clear guidelines for the
vast majority of traditional insider trading cases [ .... ] Accordingly, the Committee
[did] not intend to alter the substantive law with respect to insider trading with this
legislation.").
151. See Insider Trading: There Oughta Be a Law, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jan. 5,
2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-05/insider-trading-
should-be-against-the-law.
152. See James B. Stewart, Delving Into Morass of Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/20/business/the-insider-trading-
morass.html. See generally United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y.
2012), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 352, 354 (2014).
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Congress has taken limited steps so far to address insider trading in light
of the Newman decision. On February 27, 2015, Representative Stephen F.
Lynch of Massachusetts introduced the "Ban Insider Trading Act,"'' 53 and
Senators Jack Reed of Rhode Island and Robert Menendez of New Jersey
introduced the "Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act" on March 11, 2015.154
Although these pieces of legislation are a step in the right direction, these
acts could do more harm than good. The Senate bill makes it unclear what
type of information is prohibited but allows trading on information
received from "publicly available sources."' 155  The House bill defines
"material information as that which would be likely to have a significant
effect on the price of a security" without specifying how a "significant"
effect is determined. 156 According to the proposed legislation, the Judiciary
Branch will still be primarily responsible for defining the scope of
prohibition. 57 The issue with urging Congress to make laws specifically
prohibiting insider trading is the low chance of success in passing the law
and determining if a zero-tolerance policy will make it more difficult to
decipher the line between permissible and illegal trades. 
58
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's decision in Newman is undoubtedly a landmark
decision for insider trading cases, especially if courts decide future cases in
accordance with Newman. In some respects, the Second Circuit merely
restates what the Supreme Court held over thirty years ago in Dirks on the
elements of tippee liability. However, Newman presents the added
requirement of determining what conduct establishes the critical element of
personal benefit thus breaking from past decisions of the Second Circuit. 59
By narrowing the elements prosecutors use to define personal benefit, the
Court effectively guarantees that the Government will bring cases for
remote tippee liability only after ensuring that sufficient evidence is present
to prove the remote tippee's liability. 60 Furthermore, it is important for the
153. Peter J. Henning, Court Strikes on Insider Trading, and Congress Lobs Back,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/business/dealbook/
court-strikes-on-insider-trading-and-congress-lobs-back.html? r-0.
154. Id. (explaining that both the Senate bill and House bill would make it illegal to
trade on securities based on information that an individual knows or should have
known was nonpublic).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id.
159. See supra Part liA (analyzing the heightened standard and its implications).
160. See supra Part 111B (discussing the elements of personal benefits under
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Government to keep in mind that it can still pursue cases based on personal
relationships like friendship so long as there is some evidence of the benefit
received by the tipper was considered valuable.'
6
'
Although it is understandable why the SEC and the DOJ objected to the
heightened standards Newman imposes, the decision does not present an
insurmountable hurdle. Instead, the Government simply needs to ensure
that it has something more tangible than just friendship to sustain a
conviction for remote tippee liability.'
62
Newman).
161. Id.
162. Id.
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